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Abstract: Privacy Impact Assessments are recognized as a key step to enhance privacy
protection in new IT products and services. They will be required for certain types of
products in Europe when the future General Data Protection Regulation becomes effective.
From a technical perspective, the core of a PIA is a privacy risk analysis (PRA), which
has so far received relatively less attention than organizational and legal aspects of PIAs.
In this document, we propose a framework and methodology for conducting a PRA which
is both rigorous and systematic and illustrate it with a quantified self use-case.
Key-words: privacy, personal data, privacy impact assessment, PIA, risk, harm, regu-
lation, law, quantified self
PRIAM: Un cadre d’analyse de risques d’atteintes à la vie
privée
Résumé : La nécessité de conduire une analyse d’impact (PIA) avant tout déploiement
de système ou de service informatique présentant des risques potentiels d’atteinte à la
vie privée est désormais reconnue. Les analyses d’impact sur les données personnelles
deviendront d’ailleurs obligatoires pour certaines catégories de produits quand le nou-
veau règlement européen sur la protection des données personnelles entrera en vigueur.
L’analyse des risques en matière de vie privée, qui doit constituer la partie technique d’un
PIA, a jusqu’à présent été moins étudiée que les aspects juridiques et organisationnels
des PIAs. Ce rapport de recherche décrit une proposition de cadre et de méthodologie
pour conduire ces analyses de risques d’atteinte à la vie privée de manière rigoureuse et
systématique. Ce cadre, appelé PRIAM (Privacy Risk Analysis Methodology) est illustré
avec un cas d’étude dans le domaine du "quantified self".
Mots-clés : vie privée, données personnelles, analyse d’impact, risque, préjudice, loi,
droit, quantified self, mesure de soi
PRIAM: A Privacy Risk Analysis Methodology 3
Contents
1 Introduction 3
2 Overview of PRIAM 4
3 Information gathering phase 9
3.1 Definition of the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.1 Illustration: Definition of the FT System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2 Definition of the Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2.1 Illustration: Definition of the Stakeholder for the FT System . . . 15
3.3 Definition of the Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.3.1 Illustration: Definition of the Data for the FT System . . . . . . . 18
3.4 Definition of the Risk Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4.1 Illustration: Definition of the Risk Sources for the FT System . . . 21
3.5 Definition of the Privacy Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.5.1 Illustration: Definition of the Privacy Weaknesses for the FT System 23
3.6 Definition of the Feared Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.6.1 Illustration: Definition of the Feared Events for the FT System . . 27
3.7 Definition of the Privacy Harms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.7.1 Illustration: Definition of the Harms for the FT System . . . . . . 29
4 Risk Assessment Phase 31
4.1 Construction of Harm Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.1.1 Illustration: Construction of harm trees for the FT System . . . . 32
4.2 Risk level assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2.1 Computation of likelihood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.2.2 Illustration: Risk level assessment for the FT System . . . . . . . . 35
5 Related works 38
6 Conclusion 40
1 Introduction
Most of the new IT products and services deployed nowadays rely on the use of personal
data. If appropriate measures are not taken, they can therefore lead to a variety of
privacy breaches [29, 30, 40]. To ensure that such risks are properly understood and ad-
dressed, there is a growing recognition that a privacy impact assessment (PIA) should be
conducted before the design of a product collecting or processing personal data. Accord-
ing to Clarke [3], a privacy impact assessment is “a process whereby the potential impacts
and implications of proposals that involve potential privacy-invasiveness are surfaced and
examined". Several countries like Canada, the USA and the UK [51] have played leading
roles in this movement. Europe has also promoted PIAs in areas such as RFIDs [6] and
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smart grids [8] and is strongly emphasizing privacy and data protection risk analysis in
its up-coming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 1 [39]. Beyond legal require-
ments, conducting a PIA is a recommended step for any company intending to deploy a
potentially sensitive system or service. By contrast, several examples have shown in the
past that too hasty deployments trigger strong public opposition [1, 10, 13].
There is already a large body of contributions on PIAs and a number of PIAs for
specific products have been published [6,8]. For example, D. Wright proposes a sixteen-
step optimized PIA process based on a review of various existing PIA methodologies [50].
Official bodies such as the CNIL and NIST have also published PIA guidelines [11, 19,
20,21]. All these contributions are very useful to establish the general framework and to
help the experts in the organization of a PIA process (including planning, stakeholders
consultation, resource allocation, audits, etc.) and its main goal (evaluating the likelihood
and severity of privacy threats). However, they do not define very precisely how the
technical part of the PIA (Privacy Risk Analysis, or PRA, here) should be perfomed.
The objective of this paper is precisely to fill this gap and propose a framework and
methodology for conducting a PRA which is both rigorous and systematic. In addition,
great care has been taken to keep this framework, that we call PRIAM2 , concrete,
customizable and compatible with most existing PIA recommendations.
The framework relies on the definition of appropriate categories and attributes of
seven components (system, stakeholders, data, risk sources, feared events, harms and pri-
vacy weaknesses). The methodology is made of two main phases: information gathering
and risk assessment leading to a well-defined risk assessment process based on harm
trees.
In Section 2, we provide an overview of our PRA methodology. In Section 3 and
Section 4, we describe it and illustrate it on our running example. We discuss related
works in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2 Overview of PRIAM
Since security is an essential component of privacy, there are a number of commonalities
between a privacy risk analysis and a security risk analysis. However, privacy is a more
complex, multifaceted concept aiming at the protection of people (individuals, groups
and society as a whole) and regulated by laws. These dimensions must be taken into
account in a privacy risk analysis, especially the notion of privacy harm which has been
extensively discussed by lawyers but not really integrated within existing PRAs.
We believe that the two main challenges to conduct a PRA are (1) the consideration
of all factors that can have an impact on privacy risks and (2) the appropriate assess-
ment of these impacts and their contribution to the assessment of the overall risks. To
address these challenges, the PRIAM framework revolves around a collection of seven
components, each of them being associated with (1) a set of categories from which the
relevant elements have to be chosen for a given system and (2) a set of attributes which
1Conducting a PIA will become mandatory for certain categories of personal data processing.
2PRIAM stands for Privacy RIsk Analysis Methodology.
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have to be defined and used for the computation of the risks. The seven components
are the following: the system3, the stakeholders, the data, the risk sources, the privacy
weaknesses, the feared events and the harms (see Figure 1). The system and the set of
stakeholders are the inputs of the analysis.
The categories of a component are useful to find all the relevant elements (types of
components) for a given system. For example, data categories include, among others,
health data, location data, financial data and contact data; stakeholder categories include
data subjects, data controllers, data processors and third parties. The attributes of a
component refer to the aspects of the component that can have an effect on privacy risks.
For example, the precision level and the retention delay of the personal data collected
by a system can affect the likelihood of a risk of privacy breach. Figure 1 shows for
each component4 the associated attributes5. Table 10 (Appendix A) summarizes the
categories and attributes of all the components in PRIAM.
In addition to their direct contribution to the evaluation of privacy risks, attributes
can be used to determine the relevant categories for other components through attribute-
category links (see Figure 1) or to determine the attributes of other components through
attribute-attribute links6. Some attributes play a primary role, whereas others only play
a weak or supportive role in determining the category or attribute of another component.
These roles are pictured by strong and weak links respectively in Figure 1. For example,
the functional specification of a system completely defines the categories of data being
processed by the system (solid line). In contrast, the origin attribute of a data has a
weak influence on privacy weaknesses (dotted line). In some cases, the relevant categories
for a component also determine the relevant categories for another component through
category-category links. For example, the disclosure of personal data to unauthorized
actors may cause the data subject embarrassment, loss of reputation or dignity. Hence,
the category-category link between feared events and harms in Figure 1. Considering the
multi-dimensional nature of privacy, it is also necessary to take into account external
factors such as social and legal norms (norms in Figure 1) which can have an impact on
certain attributes or categories of components.
The value assigned to an attribute can be 1) qualitative (e.g., using a fixed scale such
as {low, medium, high}), 2) quantitative, either from a fixed set of options or from an
unbounded set of values (e.g. natural or real numbers) or 3) descriptive. Examples of
measurement scales can be found in [6, 8, 19,20,21].
The PRIAM methodology consists of two phases: the Information gathering phase
and the Risk assessment phase. The first phase consists in gathering all the relevant
information. The main difficulty for the analyst at this stage is not to overlook any
factor that could have an impact on privacy risks. The component categories and lists of
attributes are useful to this respect. The determination of the categories and attributes
of one component may depend on those of other components as shown by the links in




6We do not show these links explicitly in Figure 1 to avoid an over-crowded diagram.
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Figure 1. The characterization of the components can be done by the analyst in any order
compatible with these dependencies. The second phase (risk assessment) uses the values
of the attributes to compute the risk levels, which are pairs (severity, likelihood), for
each privacy harm. This computation is based on harm trees which are used to establish
a relationship among privacy weaknesses, feared events and harms. The details of each
of these phases are presented in Section 3 and Section 4 respectively through a running
example, introduced in Section 3.1.1.
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weak attribute-category link; strong attribute-category link; consists of the attributes; category-category link;
external factor-attribute link; input components; system; stakeholders;
data; risk sources; feared events; privacy weaknesses;
harms; external factors; system attributes; stakeholder attributes;
data attributes; risk source attributes; feared event attributes; privacy weakness attributes;
harm attributes
Figure 1: Information gathering phase for privacy risk analysis
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3 Information gathering phase
In this section, we describe the seven components to be considered (system, stakeholders,
data, risk sources, privacy weaknesses, feared events and privacy harms) and a set of
categories and attributes that should be used to define each of them. For ease of reading,
we start the description of each component by a short definition and we illustrate it with
a running example (introduced in Section 3.1.1).
We also discuss how the categories and the attributes of one component can be derived
from those of the others. We refer to Figure 1 and Figure 2 for this discussion.
Where appropriate, we provide a simple scale or rule for measuring the values of the
attributes of a component. It should be noted that these scales are merely suggestions
and different choices can be made on a case-by-case basis.
3.1 Definition of the System
The starting point of the PRA is the detailed description of the system in terms of
its attributes. The description plays a key role in the discovery of the categories and
attributes of all other components. In this respect, the system can be considered as an
input component for the PRA.
Definition 1 (System) The system defines the logical boundary of the PRA. It should
encompass the entire life-cycle of the personal data for the application (or set of applica-
tions) considered. It consists of various hardware and software components.
Attributes. The following attributes should be used to describe the system:
1. The functional specification describing the global functionalities of the system (the
services that it provides).
2. The interface including all interactions with the external world, with users and
other systems. The possibility or not to collect the consent of the user should be
defined by the interface component.
3. The data flows providing the internal view of the system, including sub-systems,
their locations, the data they store or process, access rights to these data and the
flows of the data among them. It is useful to represent the data flows in a system
through a data flow diagram (DFD) which is a structured, graphical representation
of the system based on four main types of building blocks: external entities, sub-
systems, applications, data stores and data flows.
4. The supporting assets such as hardware, applications, data stores, software envi-
ronment, etc.
5. The actors having access to the system or interacting with it, including their roles
inside the organization of the data controller.
RR n° 8876
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6. The controls consisting of legal measures (e.g., contracts between data controllers
and third parties, between data controllers and data subjects, privacy statements
and disclaimers of the data controller, Binding Corporate Rules (BCR), etc.), orga-
nizational measures (e.g., creating awareness among employees, training, incident
management, information security policy and procedures, risk management, pro-
tection measures against thefts, vendor management, etc.) and technical measures
(e.g., anonymization techniques, encryption schemes, access control and other pri-
vacy protection measures implemented in the system).
Depending on the time when the risk analysis is carried out, certain information may not
be available and the characterization of the system may remain partial. For example,
when the analysis is performed before the design of the system, only the functional speci-
fication, interface and actors may be available. Generally speaking, different frameworks
(informal, semi-formal, formal) and levels of details can be provided at this stage. When
only partial information is provided about the system, the analysis should be conserva-
tive (err on the safe side). Considering that the privacy risk analysis is a continuous
process this initial information can be completed at a later stage.
3.1.1 Illustration: Definition of the FT System
To illustrate our framework, we use an example in the area of quantified self, which is
chosen both because of its fast growth and for the various privacy risks that such systems
may pose to their users [23,25,26,38,40]. Fitness tracker devices7 allow their users to track
their number of steps, strenuous activities, heart beats and location. They generally help
users to log daily food intakes, set fitness goals, update weight changes, or participate in
challenges. They also provide users different types of derived information such as sleep
patterns, calories burnt, goals achieved, through a comprehensive dashboard. For the
rest of this work, we consider a hypothetical fitness tracker (FT) inspired by existing
products, but focusing on a subset of functionalities for conciseness. We first summarize
these functionalities8 followed by the other attributes of the system component: the
interface, the data flows, the actors and the controls.
1. Functional specification. A fitness tracking system consists of the following sub-
systems:
- Tracking Devices to collect fitness data such as number of steps or movements
as the user walks, sleeps, runs, engages in strenuous activities and GPS data.
- Wireless Sync Dongle to be used with a PC (by plugging to USB port) to
enable wireless synchronization with tracking devices.
- Smart phone, PC with wireless sync dongle attached to it are necessary to
upload data collected by tracking devices to the User Management System.
The user can access the User Interface through a PC or a smart phone (no
dongle required).
7Fitbit(http://www.fitbit.com/home), Jawbone, Garmin are some examples.
8See Table 1 for a list of abbreviations.
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- Tracking System embedded in tracking devices to store and manage collected
fitness and location data till they are uploaded to the User Management Sys-
tem. It is responsible for encrypting data sent to the User Management System
for syncing. It consists of the Tracking Application and the Tracking Data
Store (for temporary storage of tracking data).
- Tracker Connect System to be installed in smart phone or PC (with respective
versions, depending on the type of OS, etc.) by the user. It enables uploading
of data from tracking devices to the User Management System, pairing track-
ing devices to the user account, updating contact lists in the Social Network
Application (SNA) based on the phone contact list. It consists of the Tracker
Connect Application.
- User Management System to store and manage all identification, contact, pro-
file, location and fitness information of the user at the service provider’s end.
It consists of the User Data Store, the User Data Management Application, the
Fitness Management Application and the Security Management Application.
– New account and user ID creation and user profiles are handled by the
User Data Management Application. It checks whether users have pro-
vided all necessary information to access the service and that a single
tracking device is not attached to multiple accounts. It encrypts and
stores all contact/identification and profile related user data in the User
Data Store.
– The Fitness Management Application receives all fitness and location in-
formation from the Tracker Connect System and stores them, after en-
cryption, in the User Data Store. It uses different information provided by
the user and the tracking devices to derive other fitness related informa-
tion (calories burnt, sleep pattern, active minutes and distance covered)
and keeps track of his progress (achievements with respect to goals set
by the user). It provides this information to the User Interface to create
a fitness dashboard for access by the user. This data is also encrypted
and stored in the User Data Store. This application has no other security
related functions.
– The Social Network Application manages all contact lists, friend requests,
messages sent to friends, participation in contests, comparison of fitness
statistics with friends, etc. It stores all social networking related user
data in the User Data Store. Data is encrypted before storage. This
application has no other security related functions.
– The Security Management Application has security related functions.
Some of the security related functions interact with the user. These in-
clude management of privacy settings (visibility of user’s data to other
users), creation of new passwords, etc. Other security related functions
are internal and do not interact with users. These include access control
of information stored in the User Data Store by all other applications and
RR n° 8876
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actors, checking for data integrity, key generation, distribution and man-
agement (storage, re-keying, deletion, etc.), secure storage of passwords,
ensuring secure deletion of data, anonymization of data, etc.
- User Interface to enable users to interact with the system (access fitness dash-
board and profile through user account, update profile information, set fitness
targets, send messages to friends, participate in contests, etc.).
2. Interface. The contact with the user is established through User Interface, tracking
devices, smart phones and PC.
3. Data flows. Data flows among major system components are depicted in Fig. 3.
The TD, the WSD and the smart phone/PC are owned by the user. Each new
user installs the TCS on his smart phone or PC. All other systems are located with
the service provider and cannot be accessed by the user. The two main sources of
data in this system are the users themselves and the tracking devices they own.
The output data originates from the UMS. A new user creates an account with
the service provider with his identification and contact information, through the
UI over the Internet. The user is required to provide profile information (date
of birth, gender, height and weight). He may also upload other information such
as food logs and profile pictures to his profile. He may add friends to his social
network and participate in contests, surveys and send messages to friends. The
user can change the privacy settings of his account to make all or parts of profile
information (such as height, weight, age, etc.), fitness related data (such as active
minutes, sleep pattern, number of steps), location data and social network related
data visible only to his friends or only to himself. By default, all such information is
public. The UI communicates all data provided by the user for account creation and
profile update to the UMS for storage and management. The UMS communicates
user fitness related information to the UI. This information is displayed to the user
in the form of a fitness dashboard. The User Interface also provides social network
related information such as friend requests, list of friends/contacts, comparisons of
activities with friends, challenges put forward by friends, etc. to the user. It also
enables the user to search for a contact using e-mail ID and send friend requests,
write messages, challenge his friends, etc. The TS installed in tracking devices
communicate with the TCS installed in the smart phone or PC via Bluetooth Low
Energy. For PC, a wireless sync dongle is necessary for the communication. The
tracking device can automatically sync (real time or not) or sync when the user
wants to. It can also send data to the Tracker Connect system in the live mode for
the user to check his activities in real time using his PC or smart phone. The TCS
receives instructions about tracking data retrieval from the UMS and forwards them
to the TS. In response, the TS, after necessary authentication, sends its data to the
TCS which then forwards the data to the UMS. However, in the live data mode,
the data received is only displayed to the user via the Tracker Connect System but
not sent to the User Management System. In all the above cases, encrypted data is
sent after an authenticated channel has been established. The exceptional case is
RR n° 8876
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the live data mode in which tracking data is not encrypted before communication.
4. Supporting assets. These are listed in Table 11 (Appendix A).
5. Actors. Users, administrators, service technicians (for addressing issues with track-
ing devices, wireless dongle), developers (for developing tracking products and pro-
prietary applications), operators and other employees under the service provider.
6. Controls. Some important technical, organizational and legal protection measures
taken by the service provider are described in Table 12 (Appendix A).
Abbreviations Meaning
UMS User Management System
SMA Security Management Application
FMA Fitness Management Application
UDMA User Data Management Application
SNA Social Network Application
UDS User Data Store
TCS Tracker Connect System
TCA Tracker Connect Application
TS Tracking System
TA Tracking Application
TDS Tracking Data Store
TD Tracking Device
UI User Interface
WSD Wireless Sync Dongle
Table 1: List of Abbreviations
3.2 Definition of the Stakeholders
The term “stakeholder” is commonly used in the literature, generally without being de-
fined. Even though its meaning may look obvious, we define it as follows to avoid any
ambiguity.
Definition 2 (Stakeholder) Any entity (individual or organization) to whom a piece
of data relates to or who processes9 or gets access (legally or not) to a piece of data at
any stage of its lifecycle is referred to as a stakeholder.
Categories. In addition to the three types of stakeholders (data subjects, data con-
troller, data processor) set forth in the European Directive 95/46 [2] and GDPR [39], we
consider third parties (any party other than the data controller operating the system and
with whom the data subject interacts). Third parties can also be data controllers in the
sense of the law (when they process personal data received from the main data controller
9Here we define “processing” in the same way as in the EU Directive. The EU Directive [2] defines
processing of personal data as “any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data,
whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction."
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UI uploads profile data, re-ceives information derivedfrom fitness, profile, socialnetwork and location datafrom UMS
consists of; secure data flow;
runs on; connects to;
data stores; applications;
systems designed and owned by the service provider; devices owned by the user but bought from the service provider;
devices owned by the user
Figure 3: Data flow diagram for fitness tracking system
or from other subjects). For example, third parties receiving profile information about
an internet user are third parties from the point of view of the user (who may even ignore
their existence) but they are still data controllers in the sense of European Directive and
the GDPR.
Attributes. Stakeholders should be described in terms of the following attributes:
1. The data flow view depicting how data flows across stakeholders. Data originates
from the data subject and flows to the data controller. The flow may end at
the controller, unless the controller delegates data processing to one or more data
processors or third-parties receive the data from the controller (e.g., if the data
controller sells the data to third parties, which then become data controllers them-
selves). Data processors may further give access to the data to sub-processors.
Thus, data flow provides a complete view of all stakeholders who have access to
the data. This data flow view should not be confused with the data flow described
RR n° 8876
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in Section 3.1: it concerns data flows among stakeholders whereas the system defi-
nition (in Section 3.1) depicts flows of data within the system itself.
2. The stakeholder relationships (when such relationships exist) describing trust, hier-
archical dependency, economic dependency, etc. among various stakeholders. The
relationship of one stakeholder with other stakeholders can have an impact on pri-
vacy risks. Power imbalances often create difficult situations for the weaker party
even if he is a victim of illegal or unfair practices. For example, when organizations
with large user databases decide to change their privacy policy or their practices,
then the user may suffer harms without being able to do much to remedy the situa-
tion. Any hierarchical relationship may have similar problems. In some long-lasting
relationships it is possible to develop trust. For example, an individual who has
been the customer of a bank for many years may decide to trust the bank based
on his previous positive experiences with it. However, he may not trust another
bank with whom he has only recently opened an account. Betrayal in a trusted
relationship may also be more harmful to the victim as he may be caught off-guard,
as compared to betrayal in untrusted relationships where more protective measures
were employed from the beginning.
3.2.1 Illustration: Definition of the Stakeholder for the FT System
Categories. We consider three stakeholders for the FT system: the service provider
(data controller), which is assumed to be the vendor of the device10, the user (data
subject) and third parties (which may receive de-identified data according to the privacy
policy of the data controller as summarized in Table 12).
Attributes. Two attributes are associated with the stakeholders: the data flow view
(which defines the flows of data between them) and the stakeholder relationships. We
assume the following for the FT system:
1. Data flow view. Fitness, profile, contact, identification and location data flow from
users to the service provider. Data derived from all other data flow from the service
provider to users. Anonymized data may flow from the service provider to third
parties.
2. Stakeholder relationships. The user can stop using the services associated with the
FT system but cannot reuse his data with another service provider (lack of data
portability). Therefore, the situation is slightly unbalanced (in favour of the service
provider).
3.3 Definition of the Data
The personal data involved in the processing is also a key component to conduct a PRA.
10The risk analysis would be different if the service provider were the insurance company or the
employer of the user.
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Definition 3 (Personal Data [2, 7, 39]) Personal data shall mean any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person11 and any information allowing
such a person to be singled out or treated differently.
The definition of personal data used here is mainly inspired by the definitions pro-
vided by the EU Data Protection Directive (“EU Directive” in the sequel) [2] and the
GDPR [39]. The primary reason for this choice is that the EU provides a single, uniform
definition which contrasts the multiple, competing attempts at defining PII in the US.
Categories. All personal data collected or more generally processed by the system
should be considered. Data categories processed by a system are fully defined by the
functional specification of the system. For example, if the functionality of the system
(e.g., a smart grid system) is to provide consumers with detailed information about
their energy consumption, then the system definitely processes energy consumption data.
Similarly, if a system (such as smart phones) provides users with information about their
GPS position, then these systems process location data. Both these systems also process
identification and contact data of the user. The following non-exhaustive list of common
categories of personal data can be a useful starting point to identify the relevant data
for a given system:
- Identification and contact data (name, address, email address, etc.)
- Health data
- Genetic data
- Data providing information about personal life and relationships (sexual life, family
life, social life)
- Data about origin
- Judicial data
- Data about personal beliefs (religion, political, philosophical, civil unions, etc.)
- Financial data
- Data about professional life
- Behavioural data (consumption habits, leisure, etc.)
- Location data
- Technical data (IP address, MAC address, URLs, etc.)
These categories of data are not exclusive and information of one category (e.g. location
data) can be used to derive information of another category (e.g., behavioural information
11This person is the “data subject" defined in Definition 2.
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or home address). This list should just be used as a checklist and source of inspiration
to define the categories of data relevant for the system under study.
Attributes. Each data category relevant for the system under consideration should be
described using the following data attributes:
1. Attribute related to the nature of the data
(a) Sensitivity : whether the data is considered sensitive from the legal point of
view12.
2. Attributes related to the format of the data
(a) Form: the data can be in raw form or pre-processed (encryption, biometric
transformation, etc.).
(b) Precision which depends on the type of data: e.g. granularity level of geo-
location data, date or year of birth, etc.
(c) Volume: number of data items collected per time period (e.g. every 15 minutes
for electricity consumption).
3. Attributes related to the context
(a) Origin describing the data source: explicit disclosure by the subject, implicit
disclosure (e.g. collection of IP address, MAC address, video-camera pic-
tures), disclosure by a third party (e.g. friend), creation by the controller
(e.g. inference).
(b) Purpose: the reason why the data is being processed by the system.
(c) Retention: the period of time after which the data will be deleted.
4. Attributes related to control over data
(a) Visibility : the set of actors who will have access to the data (who can at least
read it).
(b) Intervenability (inspired by [55]): possibilities for the data subject to exercise
his rights (access, modification, deletion, challenge, etc.).
A detailed description of data being processed by the system using the above cate-
gories and attributes helps to determine potential privacy weaknesses and feared events.
For example, if the volume of data collected is very high then there is a possibility of ex-
cessive data collection. Similarly, unencrypted data can be a potential privacy weakness.
If the data subject is not allowed to update or modify incorrect data about himself (see
the intervenability attribute) then there is a stronger risk that the data controller stores
and uses inaccurate data. These links are further described in details in Section 3.5 and
Section 3.6.
12For example, in the European context, the EU Directive [2] provides specific requirements for data
that is sensitive and belongs to one of the following categories: health information, information about
personal life, information about one’s origin, information about personal beliefs. The GDPR [39] includes,
in addition, biometric data and genetic data.
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3.3.1 Illustration: Definition of the Data for the FT System
Categories. The FT system makes use of the following types of data:
1. Identification and contact data: name, e-mail address, physical address, user ID.
2. Profile information (associated with user ID): date of birth, gender, height, initial
weight, stride length, pregnancy status, food log, profile picture13, tracking devices
(tracking device ID) associated with the user’s account and fitness goals.
3. Social networking data: messages/challenges sent to friends, ranking of achieve-
ments (goals achieved, contests/challenges won, etc.) in comparison with friends,
comments on discussion forum, contact list14, etc.
4. Fitness information (associated with user ID): number of steps, movement infor-
mation, weight updates, heart rate.
5. Location data: from GPS signals.
6. Information derived from tracking and profile data (associated with user ID): calo-
ries burnt, active minutes, floors climbed, distance travelled and sleep pattern.
7. Technical data: browser type, operating system, IP address, etc.
Attributes. For the sake of conciseness, below we describe the relevant attributes only
for fitness data. In practice, the analyst must define relevant data attributes for all data
types.
1. Attribute related to the nature of data:
(a) Sensitivity. Not sensitive in Europe if considered as well-being data (and not
health data).
2. Attributes related to the data format:
(a) Precision. Collected one unit per user per time unit. More than one tracking
device ID cannot be used at a point of time.
(b) Volume. Tracking devices collect data every minute and store them for 7 days.
Daily records can be stored for 30 days in TDS. Heart rate data is collected
every second during running or exercising and at 5 seconds interval at other
times. The data can be uploaded to the UMS every 15 minutes if the tracking
device is near a PC or smart phone. Real time sync is also possible, if the
option is enabled by the user. Otherwise, users may choose to upload data at
any interval greater than this. However, if the interval is too big, some data
will be lost.
13uploaded by user or obtained from other SNS if those credentials are used to create this account
14from contact list of phone or other SNS if those credentials are used to create this account
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(c) Form. Encrypted and signed during storage and transmission, decrypted dur-
ing processing. All systems and actors need to authenticate themselves to
access the data.
3. Attributes related to the context
(a) Origin. All fitness tracking information are required data, explicitly collected
from users.
(b) Purpose. All fitness related data are used for determining personalized fitness
statistics for the customer such as calories burnt, distance travelled, sleep qual-
ity, weight lost, etc. De-identified data may be sold or shared with partners
or public in different ways such as by providing research reports on health,
fitness, etc. This data may also be used for research to improve products and
services.
(c) Retention. De-identified data is retained even after the user stops using the
service. Identifiable data is retained for the time the user uses the service.
4. Attributes related to the control
(a) Visibility. Visible to the user and the UMS administrator. Other users reg-
istered as friends of the user in the SNA may also be able to see this data
depending on privacy settings used by the user.
(b) Intervenability. None. All fitness data are available for downloading by the
user from the user account.
3.4 Definition of the Risk Sources
The literature often refers to the adversary or the attacker. But, here, we prefer to use
the term “risk sources” as it is less security connotated and is not limited to malicious
actors.
Definition 4 (Risk source) A risk source is any entity (individual or organization)
which may process (legally or illegally) data belonging to a data subject and whose actions
may directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally lead to privacy harms.
Categories. The categories of risk sources to be considered are: insiders (eg., system
administrator, employee), outsiders (eg., users of the system), the data controller itself,
governments and law enforcement bodies, criminals and other organizations. These cat-
egories can be derived from actors and interface attributes of the system, the data flow
view attribute of the stakeholders and the categories of data involved. The actors at-
tribute specifies various roles in the organization of the data controller that may act as
risk sources. The interface attribute determines the contact points between the system
and the external world and hence helps identifying the potential risk sources outside the
system, such as hackers, friends, acquaintances or family of data subjects, etc. The data
flow view identifies different stakeholders that handle the data and enables to identify
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stakeholders such as third parties, other data subjects, data processors and data con-
trollers themselves as potential risk sources. There may be overlaps in the usefulness of
the categories by the attributes (for example third parties may be identified both through
the interface and the data flow view attributes), but this redundancy reduces the risk
for the analyst to overlook any potential risk sources.
Attributes. Each risk source must be described using the following attributes:
1. The relationships between the risk sources and different stakeholders
(a) Insider / outsider describing whether the risk source works within the data
controller organization or not.
(b) Individual / Organization describing whether the risk source acts as an indi-
vidual or as an organization.
(c) The relationship with data subjects describing trust relationships between risk
sources and data subjects. For example, a friend or a family member is usually
trusted by the data subject, whereas limited trust is placed on the service
provider or a service technician.
2. Level of motivation
(a) Value describing the potential value of the privacy breach for the risk source
(e.g., financial benefit, retaliation, thrill, etc.).
(b) Motivation / fear describing all incentives and dis-incentives (e.g., risk of being
caught) for the risk source.
3. Resources
(a) Background information describing additional information available to the
risk source which may help it to carry out a privacy breach (e.g., detailed
knowledge of the system, security flaws, etc.).
(b) Access rights to different types of data being processed by the system (for e.g.,
a system administrator may already have access to some data whereas other
employees do not).
(c) Tools / skills, computation power available to the risk source.
As shown in Figure 2, the values of some of the above attributes such as insider
/ outsider, individual / organization and relationship with data subjects can influence
the values of other attributes such as background information, motivation/fear, access
rights, etc. The fact that the risk source is an insider or outsider can strongly determine
whether it possesses access rights to personal data, background information and also
influences the nature of tools/skills or computation power it possesses and its possible
motivation/fear. A system administrator in charge of a critical sub-system can be as-
sumed to have extensive knowledge about the system including its weaknesses and may
have been given access rights to personal data processed by the system. However, being
in such a responsible position, he may be subject to constant scrutiny (possibly at a
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higher level than other employees) and hence, expect high chances of getting caught and
fear losing his job and other severe punishments if he tries to exploit a privacy weak-
ness. Similarly, a risk source’s relationship with the data subject strongly determines the
background information he has and also influences his motivation/ fear. For example, a
close family member or a friend may be able to easily elicit hints about the password
the data subject uses to access a system or may possess detailed information about the
data subject (such as personal habits, usual locations, etc.) that can enable him to eas-
ily re-identify anonymized data. If the risk source is an organization (such as a third
party), it may have high financial motivations to re-identify anonymized data to utilize
it for its own business purposes. For example, a health insurance provider may want to
identify all its users who have unhealthy lifestyles from fitness data it buys from a fitness
tracking service so that it can increase insurance premiums. Risk sources backed by an
organization will also generally have higher financial and technical resources and hence
possess better tools/skills and computation power than individual risk sources.
The value of a privacy breach for a risk source is influenced by the data attributes
precision, sensitivity and volume. Sensitive data such as financial data, health data
definitely have more appeal to a risk source. Similarly, high volume and precision data
may be attractive to a risk source because of the possibilities of data inference that they
provide.
As discussed before, it may be possible that there are overlaps among the determi-
nants or influencers of different attributes of the risk sources, which is useful to ensure
that important factors are not overlooked during the analysis.
3.4.1 Illustration: Definition of the Risk Sources for the FT System
Categories. We consider eight main risk sources for the FT system (see Table 2).
Attributes. Table 2 provides the values of the relevant attributes for each risk source.
The values of some of these attributes (such as value and motivation/ fear) may depend
on the particular exploitation but in Table 2 we have assumed pessimistic values. In
practice, these values should also be assigned by the privacy expert. For this use-case,
risk source capability is measured using the following scale:
1. High if most attributes favour an exploitation;
2. Medium if only some of the attributes favour an exploitation;
































15Financial benefit, thrill, revenge, etc.
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Table 2: Some relevant risk sources in the FT system and their attributes
3.5 Definition of the Privacy Weaknesses
As in the previous section, we prefer to use a more general term than vulnerabilities here
and use “privacy weakness” in the following sense:
Definition 5 (Privacy weakness) A privacy weakness is a weakness in the data pro-
tection mechanisms (whether technical, organizational or legal) of a system or lack thereof
that can ultimately result in privacy harms.
Categories. Privacy weaknesses include: 1) weaknesses introduced by design choices or
choices of functionalities; 2) system design errors and 3) implementation errors. Privacy
weaknesses due to implementation errors or design flaws are akin to vulnerabilities in
traditional computer security. Privacy weaknesses due to design choices or the definition
of the functionalities of the system itself are specific to privacy. Typically, the excessive
collection of data can be a deliberate choice (either at specification time or at design
time) to accumulate data that could be exploited in the future. In the sequel, we refer
to security vulnerabilities as implementation errors causing deviations of an application
from its intended security-related functions. Functional errors refer to implementation
errors causing deviations of an application from its intended core functions.
As shown in Figure 1, the relevant privacy weaknesses are determined by the values of
system attribute controls and data attributes retention, form, precision, intervenability,
visibility and volume. They are also influenced by other system attributes supporting
16Other than system administrator, service technician, operator.
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assets and data flow and data attributes origin, purpose and representation. These
attributes help in finding the weaknesses in the data protection mechanisms. The sys-
tem attribute controls which constitute the legal, technical and organizational protection
measures implemented by the service provider provide information about the strength
of the data protection mechanisms already in place. It is therefore a major determinant
of the privacy weaknesses of the system. The privacy policy followed by the service
provider and the access control measures in place can also reveal all indicate potential
privacy weaknesses. Similarly, the form of the data, i.e., whether it is encrypted or not
during transit, storage or during computations is an indicator of a privacy weakness.
Unnecessarily long data retention periods, high precision and volume of data, and ex-
cessive visibility of data may increase the possibility of exploitations of the data. On
the other hand, if the data subjects have good intervenability on their data, then many
misuses can be addressed. The flow of energy consumption data outside the premises
of the data subject, for example, in the case of smart metering, increases the possibility
of privacy weaknesses. If such data was stored only in the consumer’s premises, then
many risk sources such as data controllers and actors within the data controller’s orga-
nization would not have access to it. These attributes also determine the category to
which each privacy weakness belongs. For example, if the data controller has already
implemented strong encryption schemes and robust keying and cryptographic parameter
selection mechanisms for secure data storage, then a privacy weakness in data storage
results from an implementation error (e.g., software error) rather than a design error.
Similarly, if the data controller has chosen to use a weak encryption scheme for data
storage, then the resulting privacy weakness in data storage is a design error (i.e., choice
of poor encryption scheme) rather than an implementation error.
Attributes. We consider only the exploitability attribute for privacy weaknesses. Ex-
ploitability denotes how easy it is to exploit a particular privacy weakness. It is es-
tablished based on the definition of the system and influenced by data attributes form,
retention, visibility, volume, precision and intervenability (see Figure 2). For example,
data in unencrypted form or data with a long retention period without sufficient pro-
tection or data with high visibility is more likely to suffer from unauthorized access.
Similarly, data of high precision and volume can be more easily used for the purpose
of data interference. On the other hand, high intervenability can prevent unauthorized
modification or retention of erroneous data.
3.5.1 Illustration: Definition of the Privacy Weaknesses for the FT System
Categories. Various privacy weaknesses of different categories are shown in Table 3.
For this use case, example of functional errors include erroneous computation of fitness
statistics such as calories burnt or active minutes by the FMA, or sending friend requests
on the phone contact list by SNA without the user prompting such requests. The SMA
has security as its core function. So, SMA errors refer to errors in security-related
functions such as key generation or access control. Security vulnerabilities also include
failures of applications such as FMA or SNA to properly encrypt data before storage.
Attributes. Table 3 shows exploitability values of some relevant privacy weaknesses of
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the FT system. We assume the following definitions:
1. Low means difficult to exploit (for e.g., the associated data is encrypted, not vis-
ible to many actors or properly de-identified, the concerned supporting assets are
difficult to access by risk sources);
2. Medium means exploitable with moderate difficulty (e.g., the associated data is
unencrypted but is of low volume and precision or not properly de-identified, the
concerned supporting assets are moderately difficult to access by risk sources);
3. High means easily exploitable (e.g., the associated data is unencrypted, is of high
volume or precision, not de-identified at all, the concerned supporting assets can
be very easily accessed by risk sources, associated data is visible to risk sources, no
possibilities of intervention by data subject, etc.).
The values are assumed to be assigned by a privacy expert.
Code Privacy Weaknesses Exploitability
V.1 Unencrypted data processing17 Medium
V.2 Unencrypted fitness and location data transmission in livemode Medium
V.5 Insufficient system audit High
V.6
TD responds to broadcasts from other bluetooth devices in
range Medium
V.7 TD does not change its private address Medium
V.8 TCS reports private address to UMS Medium
V.9 Weak anonymization of data Medium
V.10 No manual control of pairing between TD and smart phone Medium
V.11
Unencrypted log of communication between TCS and UMS
stored in smart phone/PC. Medium
V.12 Security vulnerability in FMA Medium
V.13 Functional errors in FMA Low
V.14 Functional error in SMA Medium
V.15 Security vulnerability in UDMA Medium
V.16 Security vulnerability in TCA Medium
V.17 Functional errors in TCA Low
V.18 Functional errors in TA Low
V.19 Security vulnerability in TA Medium
V.20 Security vulnerability in UI Medium
17Here, by processing, we do not consider storage and transmission.
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V.21 Non-enforcement of strong passwords for account access Medium
V.22
Not prohibiting re-identification through contracts with third
parties High
V.23
Not binding third parties to maintain appropriate level of
data protection High
V.24 Default privacy setting is “public” for all data High
V.25 Security vulnerability in SNA18 Medium
V.26 Functional error in SNA19 Medium
V.27 Lack of data minimization High
Table 3: Privacy weaknesses in the FT System and their exploitability [16,18,
42,54].
3.6 Definition of the Feared Events
We introduce a distinction between feared events which are “technical events” and privacy
harms (defined in the next section) which correspond to the impact of feared events on
people.
Definition 6 (Feared Event) A feared event is an event of the system that occurs as
a result of the exploitation of one or more privacy weaknesses and may lead to privacy
harms.
Categories. Examples of categories of feared events that an analyst should consider
include:
- Excessive data collection (e.g., collection of energy consumption data by smart
meters every 15 minutes without consumer consent).
- Unauthorized access to data20 (e.g., access to data by hackers).
- Unauthorized modification of data (e.g., modification of energy consumption data
by the service provider).
- Use of data for unauthorized purposes 21 (e.g., use of fitness data by the data
controller to build detailed user health risk profiles) and unjustified data inference
or re-identification (e.g., inference about one’s sleeping patterns or cooking habits
from energy consumption data).
18For e.g., not encrypting social network data before storing in the UDS.
19For e.g., sending friend requests to people in the phone contact list without the user prompting such
requests.
20This includes any use of data by the entity which gains unauthorized access to it.
21This includes only the use of data for unauthorized purpose by the data controller or anyone who
has been authorized by the data controller to have access to the data.
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- Storage or use of inaccurate data (e.g., not providing consumers ability to update,
modify, correct or challenge incorrect or outdated data about himself).
- Disclosure of data to unauthorized actors or unauthorized publication (e.g., data
controllers giving access to data to third parties without data subject’s consent).
- Retaining data more than necessary (including lack of deletion or ineffective dele-
tion).
As shown in Figure 1, feared event categories are determined by the privacy weaknesses
of the system. Therefore many of the attributes that determine privacy weaknesses also
contribute in the determination of feared events. Since conceptually, feared events are
more related to the data than to the system itself, as compared to privacy weaknesses,
we assume that system attributes do not play a role in determining feared events. The
data attributes retention, purpose, precision, volume, visibility, intervenability, form and
sensitivity and the stakeholder data flow view attribute determine feared events. Feared
events are also weakly influenced by the data attributes origin and representation. For
example, the data flow view reveals whether the data controller has the possibility to
disclose any data to third parties (with or without consent, with or without proper
protection measures). Similarly, the volume of data collected for a particular purpose
indicates whether excessive data collection is taking place. Along with precision, it also
reveals whether there is a possibility of excessive data inference.
Attributes. For each feared event, the following attributes must be considered.
1. Scale. It measures the number of potential individuals whose personal data is
concerned by a feared event. This is not to be confused with the victims attribute
of the harm component. In many cases, the number of victims of a feared event
is smaller than the number of victims of the corresponding harm. For example,
the unauthorized access to genetic data not only affects the specific individual
(who is the victim of the feared event) whose data has been exposed but also his
family members (who are all possible victims of harms caused by the feared event).
Similarly, behavioral trends observed for a small group of individuals (victims of
the feared event) of a particular religion or ethnicity may often be generalized for
all individuals (victims of the harm) belonging to the same group.
Depending on the actual exploitation or risk source, the scale of a feared event may
vary. For example, a rogue system administrator may either decide to target one
consumer and reveal his personal data or he may provide unauthorized access to
data belonging to many consumers. In the former case, only a single individual
is affected whereas in the latter many consumers are affected. For simplicity, we
consider only the most likely scenarios for each feared event. For example, the data
controller is more likely to practice excessive data collection for all its consumers
rather than target only a single or consumer.
2. Irreversibility. For a single individual, irreversibility denotes the difficulty with
which the feared event can be reversed.
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Two main factors influence irreversibility: the extent of exposure of the personal
data and the technical difficulty to reverse the consequences of feared event for
a data item. The second factor depends on the intervenability attribute of the
data (see Figure 2). For example, if the sleeping pattern of an individual is leaked
to the public, then this data is available to many third parties, making complete
deletion impossible in practice. The settings of a social networking site may be
poorly designed thus becoming a technical obstacle for an individual who wants to
remove an embarrassing information about him posted by a friend.
As with scale, the value assigned for irreversibility for a feared event depends on
the particular exploitation and risk source. Here, for simplicity, we consider the
most likely value for each feared event.
Irreversibility
Extent of exposure of
data due to a feared
event
Technical difficulty to

















Table 4: Measurement rule for reversibility of feared events
3.6.1 Illustration: Definition of the Feared Events for the FT System
Categories. The most relevant feared events and their attributes for the FT System
are presented in Table 5.
Attributes.
1. Scale: Public data disclosure may happen for some, but not all users22, leading to a
‘medium’ value [26]. However, if the data controller discloses data intentionally to
third parties it may do so for all users. So, we assume the most pessimistic values
here.
2. Irreversibility : It may be difficult to remove all traces of fitness data once disclosed
to the public [26]. Some relevant feared events for the FT system (determined
from privacy weaknesses and risk sources as shown in Figure 1) and their attribute
values are given in Table 5.
We assume the following values for the scale attribute:
22since, not all users use their default privacy setting
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1. Low when only a single or very few individuals are affected.
2. Medium when many individuals are affected.
3. High when all individuals are affected.
For the irreversibility attribute, we assume the values shown in Table 4.
Code Feared events Relevant scenarios Scale Irreversibility
FE.1 Excessive collection of fitnessdata
Collection of user’s fitness related data at a




Use of fitness and
identification data for
unauthorized purpose





from fitness and profile data
Health risk profiling High High
FE.4
Disclosure of identifiable
fitness related data24 to
unauthorized actors or public
Publication of sleep patterns online, selling
user health profiles to employers or data
brokers without user consent
High High
FE.9 Unauthorized access to data Criminals get access to fitness data Medium High
Table 5: Feared events and their attributes
3.7 Definition of the Privacy Harms
Privacy harm assessment is the ultimate goal of the analysis. The notion has been
exclusively studied by lawyers [15, 49] but has received less attention from computer
scientists. We consider the following definition:
Definition 7 (Privacy Harms) A privacy harm is the negative impact on a data sub-
ject, or a group of data subjects, or the society as a whole, from the standpoint of physical,
mental, or financial well-being or reputation, dignity, freedom, acceptance in society, self-
actualization, domestic life, freedom of expression, or any fundamental right, resulting
from one or more feared events.
Categories. The relevant privacy harms are derived from the feared events and external
factors such as societal norms, legal environment, etc. (see Figure 1). The following
categories of harms have been identified in previous works [15, 17, 47, 48, 49] and should
be considered in the PRA:
1. Physical harms such as physical ailments, death, injury, etc. For example, a crim-
inal may stalk and injure an individual after coming to know his precise location
every evening from check-ins posted by the individual on a social networking site.
23By using the fitness tracking devices, the user agrees to some data inference which shows him the
calories he burned, his active minutes, etc. Here, “excessive” refers to any inference that is done beyond
the expected functionality, which means without user consent.
24By fitness related data, we mean any fitness data collected by the tracking device or any data inferred
with or without user consent from fitness, profile and location data.
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2. Economic or financial harms such as loss or damage of property, unanticipated
financial loss, etc. Burglars having access to energy consumption data may infer
when the occupants are not at home or if the home security system is inactive or
not installed.
3. Mental or psychological harms constitute fear of misuse of personal data, fear of
being observed, fear of being treated unfairly, anxiety, mental distress, etc. For
example, a potential employer may turn down a a job application to a consumer
because of alleged unhealthy lifestyle inferred from his fitness data.
4. Harms to dignity or reputation include embarrassment, humiliation, etc. For ex-
ample, disclosure of intimate personal habits or unhealthy lifestyle to colleagues or
the public may cause him embarrassment.
5. Societal or architectural25 harms such as the sense of being always observed, chill-
ing effect or loss of creativity affecting the society due to constant monitoring by
government, law enforcement bodies or private companies. Remote switching off
of energy supply during periods of high demand may also deprive consumers of
utilities which are essential for leading a normal life.
Attributes. The following attributes should be considered for each harm:
1. The victims of the harm which may belong to the following categories: 1) individual
data subjects; 2) specific groups of data subjects based on age, gender, religion,
ethnicity or profession, etc. and 3) society. It is influenced by the scale attribute
of the feared event (see Figure 2).
2. The intensity of a harm expresses the various effects of a harm on the victims.
It depends on factors such as the duration of the harm or the extent of damage
caused. It is also influenced by the irreversibility of the corresponding feared event,
the stakeholder relationships and external factors such as societal norms (see Figure
2). If a feared event has high irreversibility, then its impact on the victim is more
intense than if it has low irreversibility. Similarly, weaker power positions of data
subjects with respect to data controllers may make it more difficult for data subjects
to have the harm stopped or addressed, thus increasing the intensity of the harm.
3.7.1 Illustration: Definition of the Harms for the FT System
Categories. For the FT system, we consider the following categories of harms:
1. Physical harms. A user may be stalked and injured when a criminal uses his location
data.
25In the literature on privacy harm, some scholars [15,17,47,48,49] claim that privacy harms not only
affect individuals, but the society at large. It is then sometimes referred to as “architectural harm”. For
example, persistent monitoring and social control can lead to chilling effect and lack of creativity and in
the long run impede civic life, artistic and technological innovations [15].
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2. Financial harms. A user may have to pay higher health insurance premium for his
alleged sedentary lifestyle inferred from fitness data.
3. Psychological harms. A user may suffer from mental distress when denied a job
based on his alleged unhealthy lifestyle inferred from fitness data.
4. Harms to dignity or reputation. A user may be embarrassed if his personal activities
are publicly disclosed.
Attributes. The harm attributes can be described as follows:
1. Victims, may be: a) individual data subjects; b) groups of data subjects (e.g.,
increased health insurance premium may affect some users of certain age, see Table
8).;
2. Intensity. Increased health insurance premium has long term financial effect and
so is of high intensity (see Table 8). The severity of harms is discussed in the next
section.
The attribute victims is measured using the following scale:
1. Low when only specific individuals and their families are affected.
2. Medium when individuals belonging to a group (age, gender, religion, ethnicity,
origin, profession) are affected.
3. High when society is affected.
The intensity attribute is measured using the following scale (inspired from [20,21]):
1. Low when the victim faces very few consequences of the harm, the consequences
are easily reversible and do not last for a long time.
2. Medium when the consequences of the harm can be reversed with some difficulty
and lasts for a certain length of time.
3. High when the victim faces significant consequences of the harm, the consequences
cannot be reversed at all or can be reversed with great difficulty and they last for
a long time.
Table 6 shows some intensity values for different types of harms.
Intensity Examples of harms
Low Receipt of unsolicited mails, targetted advertising
Medium
Undesirable disclosure of intimate personal habits to friends,
stalking
High
Increased health insurance premium, denial of a job,
undesirable disclosure of intimate personal habits to the
public
Table 6: Intensity of Harms
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Based on the values of the attributes victim and intensity, the severity of each harm

















Table 7: Harm severity evaluation
Harm Example of event Categories Victims Intensity Severity
H.1
Undesirable disclosure of
intimate personal habits to
the public [25,26]
Psychological, harm to
dignity Low High Significant
H.2
Increased premium for health
insurance [38] Financial Medium High Maximum
H.3
Undesirable disclosure of
intimate personal habits to
friends26
Psychological, harm to
dignity Low Medium Limited
H.4





Table 8: Harms in the FT System and their attributes
4 Risk Assessment Phase
When the information gathering phase is completed, the second phase which is the risk
assessment phase itself, can start. A harm may result from one feared event or combina-
tions of different feared events. For example, health insurance premium can be increased
if the service provider infers potential health problems from the user’s fitness data and
discloses this information to insurance providers or if unauthorized access to fitness data
takes place. Similarly, a feared event may result from the exploitation of one privacy
weakness or a combination of different privacy weaknesses and different risk sources.
Risk sources may get access to data if data is stored, processed or transmitted without
encryption or if the access control implementation is poor. The exploitation of a given
privacy weakness may contribute to the recurrence of multiple feared events. For exam-
26It includes disclosure of personal activities to friends who are not on the user’s social network or
undesirable disclosure of activities that are too personal to friends on the social network.
RR n° 8876
PRIAM: A Privacy Risk Analysis Methodology 32
ple, if the service provider does not enforce sufficient system audit, then it will be easier
(because it is likely to remain undetected) to collect excessive data, use it for unauthorized
purposes or disclose it to unauthorized actors. A natural way to express these relation-
ships among harms, feared events and privacy weaknesses is through harm trees. Harm
trees are akin to attack trees in computer security [4, 12, 14, 27, 28, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 53].
The use of this type of trees is not new for privacy, even if very few papers have been
published on this topic. In [22], Deng et al. use threat trees to link what they define as
threats to vulnerabilities in a system. Similarly, Friginal et al. [24] describe attack trees
to link what they define as adverse impacts (e.g., disclosure of the nearest friends of an
user) to attack scenarios (e.g., hacking a device). However, these works do not provide
an end-to-end link between privacy harms and exploitations of privacy weaknesses as
described here.
4.1 Construction of Harm Trees
The root node of a harm tree denotes a harm. Leaf nodes represent privacy weaknesses
exploited by the most likely risk source for the particular harm and represented by pairs
(privacy weakness, risk source)27. The tree is structured in branches leading to the harm.
Feared events are connected by an AND node if all of them are necessary to lead to the
harm. On the other hand, if any one of several feared events lead to a harm then they
are connected by an OR node. Similarly, the exploitation of privacy weaknesses leading
to a feared event are connected by an AND node if all such exploitations must happen in
order for the feared event to take place. When any one of a set of privacy weaknesses is
sufficient to lead to a feared event then they are connected by an OR node. Harm trees
can be used not only to compute the likelihood of harms but also to identify the privacy
weaknesses that have to be addressed to reduce the risk to an acceptable level.
4.1.1 Illustration: Construction of harm trees for the FT System
Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively show the harm trees for the three harms
“disclosure of intimate personal habits to the public (H.1)”, “increased health insurance
premium (H.2)” and “disclosure of intimate personal habits to friends28 (H.3)” in FT.
H.3 includes the disclosure of personal habits to friends who are not members of the
user’s social network or undesirable disclosure of habits that can be considered as too
personal (how many times the user wakes up during the night, how long he sleeps, what
unhealthy food he indulges in, recent weight gains, pregnancy status, etc.) to friends
on the social network. As shown in Table 8, disclosure to friends and the public may
have very different effects, at least in terms of intensity. The harm trees in Figure 4 and
Figure 6 also show that they may take place in different ways (i.e., by the exploitation
of different privacy weaknesses by different risk sources).
27Strictly speaking, a harm tree should be associated with a set of risk sources. This set can be a
singleton in case of individual risk source or denote a group of risk sources, who may be colluding or
not, depending on the interactions needed to exploit the privacy weaknesses.
28While computing risks, we assume that the friend is not a hacker.
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Figure 4: Harm tree for the undesirable disclosure of intimate personal habits to the
public (H.1)
H.1 may result from the disclosure of identifiable personal fitness related data to the
public due to default privacy setting “public” or because the data controller decides to
publish poorly de-identified data without taking sufficient measures to stop third parties
who get access to such data from re-identifying them. It may also result from unautho-
rized access by hackers to data by exploiting various privacy weaknesses in the system
(such as processing of unencrypted, poorly anonymized data, security vulnerabilities in
the UMS) who then release this data to the public.
H.2 (increased health insurance premium) can result from the service provider selling
to health insurance providers data (e.g., health risk profiles) derived from fitness data
by excessive inference without proper de-identification (see Figure 5). We assume that
the health insurance provider itself is very unlikely to access fitness data unscrupulously
(i.e., either exploit privacy weaknesses itself to access the data or simply buy it from
unscrupulous actors such as hackers or malicious insiders who have access to the data).
Here, we assume that the user has not been informed about the possibility of such uses
of his fitness data. Hence, the increased health insurance premium due to a health risk
profile generated from his fitness related data is unanticipated by the user. However,
it should be emphasized that this analysis is very much dependent on our assumptions
about the FT System. If the provider of the FT System were the health insurance
provider of the user and health insurance is one of the purposes of the processing, then
increased health insurance premium is not necessarily a harm.
H.3 can happen because of the disclosure of identifiable personal fitness data to friends
not members of the social network due to default privacy setting of “public” or because of
unauthorized access to data by friends (in the social network or outside it) by exploiting
various privacy weaknesses (such as poor passwords, security vulnerability in TCA, etc.).
4.2 Risk level assessment
As usually done in the IT security area, the risk level for a privacy harm is determined as
the pair: (severity, likelihood). The severity assessment for the FT System was described
in Section 4.2.2. We describe the computation of the likelihood of harm in Section 4.2.1
and apply it to the FT System in Section 4.2.2.
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Figure 5: Harm tree for increased health insurance premium (H.2)
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Figure 6: Harm tree for the undesirable disclosure of intimate personal habits to friends
(H.3)
4.2.1 Computation of likelihood
The likelihood of a harm is the probability of the occurrence of the harm. It depends
on the likelihood of the feared events which can be computed on the basis of the harm
trees. A harm tree may involve several risk sources. This is specially true in cases of
unauthorized access to data where such access may be gained by different risk sources
such as hackers or rogue system administrators. Therefore, the exact risk source depends
on the precise conditions of the occurrence of the feared event. Some risk sources may
be more likely to act than others. For example, if an unauthorized access to fitness data
is made possible by exploitation of a functional error in the SMA then the likely risk
sources are rogue hackers or rogue operators of the system or rogue UI administrators29.
On the other hand, excessive collection of fitness data can occur just because the data
controller (service provider) decides to do so. Thus, for each path in the harm tree, we
consider only the most likely risk source.
Likelihoods can be computed in different ways, either symbolically (based on a fixed
scale of levels such as “negligible”, “limited”, “significant”, etc.) or using numerical values
(probabilities). Each approach has its benefits and drawbacks. Typically, probabilities
may be difficult to estimate for input values and may look difficult to grasp by decision
makers. In contrast, symbolic values are sometimes too fuzzy and may lead to different
interpretations. We propose the use of a combined approach here, with symbolic input
and output values which are converted into numerical values for processing based on the
harm trees and converted back into symbolic values for the final output (likelihood of the
29The UMS administrator already has access to fitness data
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harm). We provide an example of this approach in Section 4.2.2. We wish to emphasize
however, that different choices of representation can be made by the analyst, provided
that they are properly documented and justified.
The complete steps for computing likelihood are as follows:
1. Find the value of exploitability for each leaf node in the harm tree.
2. For each exploitation, choose the values of the relevant attributes of the risk source
most likely to exploit the privacy weakness leading to the harm.
3. Find out the likelihood of each of these exploitations from the above exploitability
value and values of the relevant risk source attributes.
4. Compute the likelihood of each feared event and harm according to the following
rules30, where Pi is the likelihood of ith child node:
R1. AND node with independent child nodes:
∏
i Pi.
R2. AND node with dependent child nodes31: Mini(Pi), i.e., minimum of the
likelihoods of the child nodes.
R3. OR node with independent child nodes: 1−
∏
i(1− Pi).
R4. OR node with dependent child nodes32:
∑
i Pi.
4.2.2 Illustration: Risk level assessment for the FT System
We evaluate the risk levels for the three harms “undesirable disclosure of intimate personal
habits to the public (H.1)”, “undesirable disclosure of intimate personal habits to friends
(H.3)” and “increased health insurance premium (H.2)” in Figure 7, Figure 8 and Figure
9. At the leaf nodes of the harm trees, we show (in curly braces) the exploitation
likelihoods. Table 9 shows the how these likelihoods can be derived from the exploitability
of the privacy weaknesses and the relevant attributes of the risk sources who perform
the exploitation. At each AND or OR node, we show the rule (in curly braces) used
for combining the likelihoods of the child nodes. Each nodes denoting a feared event
is associated with the likelihood of the corresponding feared event and the root node is
associated with the likelihood of the harm.
We use the following symbolic values for likelihood values (p):
1. Negligible (N) for p < 0.01%;
2. Limited (L) for 0.01% ≤ p < 0.1%;
3. Intermediate (I) for 0.1% ≤ p < 1%;
30The rules are applied bottom-up.
31In order to err on the safe side in terms of privacy protection, we consider dependent nodes such
that one node may imply another node.
32In order to err on the safe side in terms of privacy protection, we consider dependent nodes such
that one node may exclude another node.
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4. Significant (S) for 1% ≤ p < 10%;
5. Maximum (M) for p ≥ 10%.
Based on the input values (which are assumed to result from the expertise of the
analyst) shown in Figure 7, Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively, the risk levels of H.1, H.3
and H.2 are evaluated to (significant, maximum), (limited, maximum) and (maximum,
limited) respectively. At this stage, the decision maker (with the help of the analyst)
can decide whether these risks are acceptable and, for the risks which are not deemed
acceptable, choose appropriate counter-measures.
Since severity is an inherent measure of the damage caused by a harm, it cannot
be reduced. The only factor that is in our control is the likelihood of harms which in
turn depends on the likelihood of feared events and those of privacy weaknesses. A
counter-measure can reduce the likelihood of one or more privacy weaknesses and thus
reduces the likelihood of the harm that these privacy weaknesses lead to. Therefore, the
most appropriate set of counter-measures is one that brings the risk level of all harms
associated with the system below a given acceptable level and at the same time leads to
minimal costs for implementation. This set of counter-measures can thus be obtained by
solving a suitable optimization problem with appropriate constraints on the budget and
the reduced level of likelihood. We note here that counter-measures can be of different
types: technical, organizational and legal. The costs of implementing these counter-




















Majority do not favour
Maximum Majority favour
Maximum All favour
Table 9: Measurement rule for likelihood of exploitation
RR n° 8876































































































































































































































PRIAM: A Privacy Risk Analysis Methodology 38




(V.24;A.1){M} . . .
FE.9{S}
OR




Figure 8: Risk level assessment for undesirable disclosure of intimate personal habits to
friends (H.3)








Figure 9: Risk level assessment for increased health insurance premium (H.2)
5 Related works
As discussed in the introduction, PRA should be embedded within a more general privacy
impact assessment (PIA) as it corresponds to the technical part of a PIA. The literature
on PIA mostly consists of: 1) proposals [50] focussing on organizational and management
level tasks such as PIA team formation, preparation of a PIA plan, agreement on budget,
etc. but only indicative about privacy risk analysis (PRA) steps; 2) proposals [11, 19,
20, 21, 22, 24, 31] focussing almost entirely PRA and 3) proposals [6, 8] that describe all
steps of a PIA (including risk analysis) in some details. Since the focus of this work is
solely PRA, we only discuss the PIA process described by Wright [50] and devote the
the rest of this section to discuss how our work deviates from the second and third types
of proposals.
The PIAF (Privacy Risk Assessment Framework) project has reviewed various ex-
isting PIA processes and methodologies [5, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37] and has proposed an
optimized PIA process [50]. When compared to the second and third types of propos-
als [6, 8, 11, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 31], the overall description of the PIA process [50] is at a
higher level, focussing on what needs to be done rather than the precise details about
how it is to be done. The PIAF framework defines the phases of a PIA that need to be
carried out at the organizational and management levels such as PIA team formation,
preparation of a PIA plan, agreement on a budget, identification and consultation with
project stakeholders, third-party review and/or audit of the PIA, embedding privacy
awareness in the organization and ensuring accountability, etc. It also includes more
technically oriented steps such as the analysis of information flows and privacy impacts
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and risk identification, but they are only indicative. For example, it is mentioned that
risks should be assessed for their likelihood and consequences but there is no detailed
description on how this assessment can be done. It does not go either into the details
of system description, feared events or harms. Wright [50] stresses the importance of
identifying all project stakeholders, i.e., whoever may be affected by the project, technol-
ogy or service (such as regulatory authority, customers, citizen advocacy groups, service
providers and manufacturers) so that they can be adequately consulted during the PIA
process. He suggests that the range and number of stakeholders to be consulted should
be a function of the privacy risks, assumptions about the frequency and consequences of
these risks, and the number of consumers who can be impacted.
In the rest of this section, we discuss other PRA methodologies [6,8,11,19,20,21,22,
24,31] and relate them to PRIAM in terms of terminology and methodology.
The literature on PRA methodologies use a variety of terminologies and definitions
to refer to PRA components. Vulnerability [6,8,19,20,21,24] is the most commonly used
term for privacy weakness. It has also been referred to as “pre-condition” in [22, 52].
Some works [8, 19, 20, 21] contain no specific reference to privacy harms but refer to the
impact of feared events on data subjects, termed “prejudicial effect”, while measuring
the severity of feared events. Others [6, 11, 31] also consider impacts for system opera-
tors or organizations. The term feared events has rarely been used in the sense of our
definition. The CNIL methodology [19] refers to a feared event as an “incident that
affects availability, integrity or confidentiality of primary assets". The updated version
of this methodology [21] re-defines it as “breach of personal data security likely to have
impacts on data subjects’ privacy". The latter definition is the closest in the literature
to what we mean by feared events in this work. No other work uses the term feared
events. The LINDDUN framework [22, 52] discusses a number of privacy threats and
also identifies events (privacy weaknesses in our terminology) that may lead to any of
them. It does not define feared events. In [9], threats are not explicitly defined but
it has been stated that threats lead to privacy harms. Threats, in their context, may
arise from data processing: unjustifiable or excessive data collection, use or storage of
inaccurate or outdated data, inappropriate use of data, lost or stolen data, unjustifiable
or unauthorized access, transfer, sharing or publishing of data. Similarly, according to
Oetzel and Spiekermann [31], threats prevent reaching a privacy target which represents
what needs to be achieved for privacy protection, derived from EU privacy laws. The
concept of privacy target is also used in the BSI framework [6]. In Friginal et al. [24],
threat sources lead to threat events that affect privacy assets. They do not differentiate
between threats and feared events and focus on one specific type of threat, the disclosure
of assets. In some works [22,24,52], the terms “attacker” or “adversary” are used instead
of risk sources. Unlike our definition, the CNIL guidelines [19, 20, 21] and the PIA on
smart grids [8] use the term risk sources to refer to both human and non-human sources
of risk. In this work, we have chosen the terminologies such that they carry as little
security connotation as possible. Through them, we have tried to emphasize that the
impact of privacy breaches is significantly different from that of security incidents and
their causes may not always involve malicious actors or intentions.
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In PRIAM, we show all the information required for the risk assessment process
and indicate how they can be gathered by clearly identifying various attribute-attribute,
attribute-category and category-category links. We also consider the influence of external
factors such as social or legal norms as norms in determining certain categories and
attributes. For example, we show that different attributes of data such as form, retention,
sensitivity, volume, etc. along with attributes of other components such as the system can
help to determine categories of privacy weaknesses and feared events. Such links are not
well-established or, at least, not well-depicted in other works [8, 11, 20, 21, 22, 24, 31, 52].
The absence of such links raises questions about the completeness of the lists of data,
feared events, privacy weaknesses, harms, risk sources, etc. considered in them. In our
case, victims and intensity direct the measurement of severity of harms. In [6], only
duration of the adverse impact is considered when assigning a value. Most works do
not consider an exhaustive list of categories of harms. Some works consider only social
standing, reputation, financial well-being, personal freedom [6,31] whereas others [20,21]
consider physical, material and moral impacts. In some use cases, such as smart metering,
social harms can play a significant role.
Risk assessment, in our work, entirely depends on harm trees which link privacy
weaknesses and risk sources to harms, via feared events. The LINDDUN framework
[22,52] uses threat trees to link what they define as threats to vulnerabilities in a system.
Similarly, Friginal et al. [24] describe attack trees to link what they define as adverse
impacts (e.g., disclosure of nearest friends of an user) to attack scenarios (e.g., hacking a
device). However, these works do not provide an end-to-end link between privacy harms
and privacy weaknesses. Harm trees clearly depict the contribution of different privacy
weaknesses and risk sources in the occurrence of a particular harm.
We present the risk level of a harm as the pair: (severity, likelihood). Some proposals
[11] include the computation of risk as a product of likelihood and impact. Others have
used a risk map with severity and likelihood on its axes [8, 19, 20, 21] to plot estimated
risks.
6 Conclusion
The PRIAM methodology, introduced in this report, makes it possible to conduct a
PRA in a systematic and traceable way. In addition, it provides a set of components,
attributes and categories which can be very helpful to reduce the risk of overlooking
or under-estimating key factors for the evaluation of the privacy risks. Based on this
analysis, it is possible to select a set of counter-measures that brings the risk level of all
harms associated with the system below a given acceptable level and at the same time
leads to minimal costs for implementation by solving a suitable optimization problem
with appropriate constraints on the budget and the reduced level of likelihood. We leave
detailed work on counter-measure selection based on PRIAM for future work. Harm trees
illustrated in Section 4 can be the basis of selecting counter-measures that minimize risks
for all harms and also satisfy a suitable budget. A study of all harm trees corresponding
to harms whose risk levels are above a given acceptable threshold also reveal the privacy
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weaknesses that have the strongest impact on these harms. For example, Figure 4, Figure
6 and Figure 5 reveal that weak anonymization of data is a common privacy weakness.
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One database server, application servers, load balancer, clients (PC,
notebook, tablet, mobile phone, printer, etc.), storage media
(semiconductor, optical, paper), network components (switch, router,
bridge, gateway, firewall, modem), tracking devices, wireless sync dongle
Applications FMA, UDMA, SMA, TA, TCA, SNA
Data stores TDS, UDS
Software
environment
standard software, operating systems, device driver, firmware, services
(mail, file, etc.)
Table 11: Supporting Assets for the FT System
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1) All user data are encrypted using AES-CCM during internal data storage and movement
on the service provider’s side; 2) TD authenticates with the TCS by computing a MAC over
random bits, using a CBC-MAC with XTEA block cipher; 3) TCS and UMS communicate
over an encrypted TLS connection.; 3) 128 bit keys are used. Keys are are renewed (old
data re-keyed and new data encrypted with new key) once a year or whenever a
compromise is suspected. TLS is used for securing keys in transit.; 4) Strong random
number generators for generation of cryptographic parameters are used.; 5) Integrity and
authenticity of data are verified before acting on them further.; 6) Users can modify privacy
settings to make any information visible only to themselves or only to friends or to anyone.
All data are public by default.; 7) Users can disable automatic sync and live data mode.; 8)
Users can enable or disable at any time sharing of personally identifiable data with third
party service providers such as social networking sites and health data storage providers.; 9)
Detailed network device, operating system, web server, mail server, database server,
application logging with built in tamper detection, storage in read-only media and access
privilege restricted only to UMS administrators. Logs are reviewed periodically. Access to
logs require prior approval and is recorded and monitored. Log data is not shared with any
third party.; 10) Account lock-out period of 10 minutes when multiple log-in failure occurs.;
11) Passwords cannot be less than 8 characters. A secure password recovery system is also
implemented. Passwords are transmitted over TLS.
Organizational
measures
1) Disaster recovery program for critical business applications such as SMA, FMA and
UDMA; 2) Establishment of dual role for key custodian so that the knowledges of two
individuals are required to perform key management tasks.; 3) Frequent training and
awareness programs for UMS administrators and operators enabling them to practice secure
data handling.; 4) Employ trustworthy and trained UMS administrators to understand
their responsibilities as custodians of cryptographic keys, reviewer of system logs, etc. They
must sign a form stating that they understand their responsibilities.; 5) Information
security policy and supporting standards and controls in which mandatory and
recommended policy statements include, among others, access control, asset management,
communications and operations security, human resources security, information systems
acquisition, development and maintenance, physical and environmental security and risk
assessment.; 6) Security certification process for applications and systems to confirm that
they abide by the organization’s information security policy and secure application
development standards.; 7) Security incident management program to effectively control
and remedy security related incidents.
Legal measures
1) Data handling policy for international users: subject to US laws, compliance with
US-EU Safe Harbour Framework and US-Swiss Safe Harbour Framework with certification
of adherence made available; 2) Policy for sharing data with third parties: de-identified
data can be sold or used for different purposes such as research on health and fitness;
identifiable data can be shared to fulfil legal obligations and in case of merger, bankruptcy,
sale of assets, etc.; 3) The service is not meant for children below the age of 13 years; 4)
Contract between the service provider and the third party handling Purchase Management
system, with commitment to safeguard personal data received from the former.; 5) Privacy
statement and disclaimers on User Interface for users to agree before opening an account. It
specifies the following: i) types of data collected by the service provider; ii) the purpose of
the collection for each type of data; iii) retention period of data; iv) policy for sharing data
with third parties; v) policies for children; vi) how to modify data, deactivate accounts, etc.
vii) data handling policy for international users.
Table 12: Controls implemented in the FT System
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